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1 National approach to flexicurity  
This paper has been prepared for a Peer Review within the framework of the Mutual 
Learning Programme. It provides information on Belgium’s approach to flexicurity in 
comparison with the Host Country for the Peer Review. For information on the policy 
example, please refer to the Host Country Discussion Paper. 
From the perspective of the so-called “Wilthagen Matrix”, Belgium’s flexicurity profile is 
traditionally more oriented towards job security and income security than it is towards 
employment security and combination security. As such, Belgium is part of a continental 
cluster of countries that have historically emphasized job security and relatively low 
external flexibility in their labour market organisation1.  The formal adoption, since 
2006, of flexicurity as a pan-European policy aim has not (yet) fundamentally altered 
this reality.  
In the run-up to the global financial crisis, flexicurity failed to unite Belgium’s social 
partners and political parties behind an ambitious reform agenda2.  The subsequent 
crisis years have understandably focused energies on crisis measures while not 
favouring fundamental policy reflections. By and large, Belgium’s labour unions still 
remain largely to be convinced of flexicurity’s win-win potential, essentially seeing 
increased flexibility as its only security. Belgian employer organisations, on the other 
hand, remain suspicious of increased costs associated with flexicurity at the HR level, 
particularly against a back-drop of wage cost handicap and loss of market share in 
exports. Finally, Belgium’s politicians have been stuck in a cycle of institutional, financial 
and economic crises since 2006, with predictable mixed results. 
Belgium’s labour market has shown some of the tell-tale signs of serious economic 
stress since 2008. Temporary workers have borne the brunt of initial job cuts, working 
time reductions have reduced job losses among insiders, job creation has fallen, and 
unemployment levels have risen3.  However, a combination of macro-economic luck and 
crisis policy has lowered the immediate labour market costs of the economic crisis in 
comparison with many other Eurozone countries.  
From a broad macro-economic perspective, Belgium did not face a deflating real estate 
bubble and benefitted from its close connection to the resilient German economy, while 
its domestic governments did not embrace full “austerity” in the midst of a cyclical 
downturn4.  At the same time, the federal government extended temporary 
unemployment benefits to permanent workers of crisis-stricken companies, again 
smoothing the crisis impact. Helped further by replacement opportunities through 
retiring baby-boomers and by lavish job subsidies that account for 100% of all net job-
growth since 2007, Belgium all-in-all was able to reduce the short-term labour market 
damage of the crisis significantly5.  While it has mostly done so by avoiding transitions 
and through direct job creation schemes, potentially against the flow of flexicurity, it 
has nonetheless also adopted a number of piecemeal reforms that clearly do reflect 
flexicurity orientations. 
                                           
1 See, recently, T. Wilthagen, Flexicurity in bedrijf: het beste van twee werelden?, Itinera Institute, Analyse 
2014/6, available at www.itinerainstitute.org. 
2 See M. De Vos and J. Konings, Van baanzekerheid naar werkzekerheid op de Belgische arbeidsmarkt, 
Intersentia, 2007; -, D’une sécurité d’emploi vers une sécurité du travail sur le marché du travail belge, 
Anthémis, 2007. Compare, COM(2013) 351 final, 29 May 2013. 
3 See the annual reports of Belgium’s High Council for Employment, available at www.employment.belgium.be 
4 For an overview of the data, see I. Van de Cloot, Budgettaire uitdagingen voor België, Itinera Institute, 
Analyse 2013/14, available at www.itinerainstitute.org  
5 See Hoge Raad voor de Werkgelegenheid (High Council for Employment), Jaarverslag 2014 (annual report 
2014), available at www.employment.belgium.be 
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2 Assessment of the policy measures 
2.1 Brief overview of Belgium’s post-crisis policy flexicurity 
measures 
While subsidized job creation stands out as the hallmark of Belgium’s labour market 
reality since the advent of the crisis, Belgium’s labour market policy has evolved in 
directions more familiar to a flexicurity agenda as well. In what follows, we briefly 
summarize developments mirroring the structure of the Danish report. 
Working time flexibility in Belgium has been increased by raising the maximum 
amount of overtime within a reference period of one calendar year: from 65 to 91 hours 
by law, or to 130 hours if a collective bargaining agreement can be reached.6 In the 
same vein of favouring flexible work, the possibility for companies to use temporary 
agency workers has been extended beyond peaks and illnesses to vacancies. Essentially 
formalizing a widespread pre-existing practice, the new rule allows employers to use 
temporary agency work to test potentials for job openings, while also restricting the 
possibility to use day contracts.7 
Systemic wage moderation has been an official Belgian policy since 1996, with a bi-
annual cycle of maximum wage margins that reflect expected wage cost increases in 
Belgium’s neighbouring economies. Aiming to boost competitiveness and improve job 
creation, the federal government has frozen wage-growth altogether for 2013-14 in the 
private sector.8 This wage freeze does not cover Belgium’s well-known automatic wage 
indexation tied to consumer price inflation, however. 
Whereas the bulk of Belgium’s ALMP has remained focused on subsidies for job 
creation, activating measures for improving employability were also on the menu of 
Belgian crisis responses. Here, the combination of federal and regional policy – the result 
of Belgium’s decades-long devolution process – comes into play. A new nation-wide 
programme for paid internships for young job seekers (younger than 25) with no high-
school degree was launched with an ambitious target of helping 10,000 people into their 
first jobs. So far, it has not lived up to expectations, reportedly reaching only about one 
tenth of the target. 
Symbolically, the biggest change in Belgium’s labour market policy of the period was 
the realization of a single dismissal law status for blue collar and white collar workers. 
Under the pressure of a Constitutional Court ruling that had held the difference in 
dismissal status to be unconstitutional, the federal government succeeded where 
decades of social partner bargaining had previously failed: a new unified dismissal law. 
The new law not only unifies notice periods and in-lieu payments: it also attempts to 
modernize dismissal by including an active component. Sectoral collective bargaining 
agreements are expected, by 2019, to provide that dismissed workers who are entitled 
to a notice period or in-lieu payment of at least 30 weeks, will receive a third of their 
dismissal package through measures that increase the employability of the dismissed 
worker. It remains to be seen whether the bargaining will follow if workers favour hard 
cash over services: failure will only result in the employer having to top up notice pay 
with a contribution of 4%.9  
The modernized dismissal law has also extended and generalized the outplacement 
obligation that was already part of Belgium’s legal framework for dismissal. Before 2014, 
outplacement services were a right only for dismissed workers older than 45. This right 
is now extended. Anyone with a notice period or in-lieu payment of at least 30 weeks, 
irrespective of age, is entitled to 60 hours of outplacement services paid for by the 
                                           
6 Act of 17 August 2013, OJ 29 August 2013. 
7 CBA n° 108, 16 July 2013. 
8 Decree of 28 April 2013, OJ 2 May 2013. 
9 Articles 92 and 93 of the Act of 26 December 2013, 0J 26 December 2013. 
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employer. As of 2016, employees will be obliged to participate in the outplacement, 
turning a right into a duty. 
As in Denmark, Belgium has tinkered with its unemployment insurance with an aim 
to increase labour supply and willingness to work. Belgium famously provides 
unemployment benefits of unlimited duration, making the activation of the unemployed 
a pressing need from a perspective of labour market participation. For a number of 
years, Belgium’s official employment agencies – first in Flanders, then also in Wallonia 
and Brussels – have increasingly embraced follow-up policies towards the unemployed, 
complemented with a more systematic supervision and sanctioning at the (federal) level 
of benefit payment.10 The crisis period has seen the continuation of this process.  
On the one hand, personal follow-up has been extended to cover the unemployed until 
age 58 (Flanders). On the other hand, the federal employment agency in charge of 
verifying benefit eligibility, has extended its process of screening labour market 
availability to include the unemployed up to age 54. This screening process is based on 
initial interviews, followed by personal agreements with the unemployed who show 
insufficient job-finding efforts. Interviews only take place after 15 or 21 months of 
unemployment, depending on whether the unemployed is younger or older than 25 
years. 
Since 2012, two target groups of unemployed have moreover seen a change in their 
benefit system, again with an activation purpose. For the long-term unemployed, a new 
system of accelerated gradual benefit reduction has been designed. After one year of 
continuous unemployment, unemployment benefits are gradually reduced, the tempo 
depending on the years of previous employment. After a period of no more than five 
years, all the unemployed fall back on a fixed-sum benefit. The reform was adopted to 
encourage re-employment but is highly contested by the labour unions. Its statistical 
impact is as yet unclear. Finally, for first entrants on the labour market the 
unemployment insurance has been adjusted to avoid immediate entitlement to benefits. 
They now need to wait an entrance period of 310 days, after which time they are entitled 
to insertion benefits for no longer than 36 months. 
Overall, these changes reflect a growing concern for extending careers and boosting 
labour market participation, against the backdrop of demographic ageing and rising 
pension costs. Other reforms have gone in the same direction. Early retirement 
schemes have, once again, been restricted and made more onerous, but they have 
nonetheless remained standard practice in the big company restructurings of the crisis 
period.11 A complementary rule requiring employers to follow the age pyramid of their 
companies when selecting personnel for collective redundancy was adopted in 2012 but 
its implementation has been stalled so far.12  
An increased emphasis on career development has also led to the adoption of a career 
voucher system in Flanders, providing people who have at least one year of 
professional experience with a counselling package of four hours at an authorized career 
centre.13  
2.2 Assessment from the perspective of Danish post-crisis 
evolutions 
Contrary to Denmark, Belgium’s automatic stabilizer is not a labour market organization 
that actively supports transitions, but rather the income security of the welfare state. 
Much of Belgium’s immediate crisis response was directed to providing income security, 
especially through generous temporary unemployment and subsidized job creation 
schemes, the short-term impact of which was to avoid layoffs and unemployment 
                                           
10 See also OECD, Enhancing the inclusiveness of the labor market in Belgium, 2013. 
11 So-called “bridge pensions” have been re-baptised “unemployment with a surplus”, reflecting their nature 
but intended to emphasize the need for continued labour market availability. 
12 Act of 29 March 2012, OJ 30 March 2012 and CBA n° 104 of 27 June 2012. 
13 Flemish Government Decision of 17 May 2013, OJ 11 July 2013. 
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respectively. The long-term impact, both as regards economic growth potential and 
insider/outsider entrenchment on the labour market, remains unclear. 
Work and wage flexibility reforms during the crisis have apparently been more 
pronounced in Belgium than in Denmark. This would reflect a more compelling need: 
Belgium’s economy has a structural wage cost handicap and its labour laws have, 
contrary to Denmark’s, traditionally disfavoured flexible work arrangements. The crisis 
has served as an accelerator to address some of these concerns, albeit on an ad hoc 
basis. 
Belgium’s open-ended unemployment insurance is an outlier, and its institutional 
context of overlapping regional and federal competences has not made an effective 
activation approach easy. Notwithstanding these singularities, Danish and Belgian 
unemployment reforms during the crisis both bear the hallmarks of budgetary 
constraints, reflected in a shortening and/or tightening of unemployment benefits.  
As regards the bread-and-butter ALMP, Denmark remains a cycle ahead of Belgium. 
Belgium’s “active” labour market policy is in fact a great deal near-passive job subsidies 
for employers, instead of services and rehabilitation for job seekers. Belgium has not 
yet reached the stage of openly assessing cost-benefit and effectiveness of ALMP, 
although anecdotal evidence and reporting has surfaced. 
  
Mutual Learning Programme Peer Country Paper 
 
October ,  2014 5 
 
3 Assessment of the success factors and transferability 
Contrary to Denmark, flexicurity has not yet entered the DNA of the Belgian labour 
market organization and its stakeholders. However, one cannot survey the crisis years 
without noticing how several of the piecemeal Belgian reforms in some way do reflect 
strands of the flexicurity matrix. This may in part attest to the flexibility of the flexicurity 
concept itself, but it also suggests that the intellectual framework of flexicurity has 
indeed managed to survive and inspire during what has been the most difficult economic 
period in more than a generation. 
However, it is fair to say that Belgium’s crisis measures, irrespective of their intrinsic 
compatibility or incompatibility with flexicurity principles, are more patchwork than 
strategy. They are more reactive in the face of pressure than proactive as a consequence 
of vision. Indeed, the crisis has not enabled the decision makers and the stakeholders 
of the Belgian labour market to coalesce around a shared ambition for improvement and 
reform. Quite the contrary, social partners are profoundly divided and many of the 
reforms described above were and remain politically highly contested as well. This 
appears to be not altogether different from the Danish recent experience. 
While several of the reform measures outlined above can be meaningful from a 
flexicurity perspective, Belgium is still a long way off from achieving a comprehensive 
reform package that genuinely addresses the structural shortcomings of its labour 
market performance. Indeed, it may well be that the early focus on reinforcing the 
security of existing jobs while heavily subsidizing other jobs in preferred sectors will 
further entrench the already deep segmentation that characterizes the Belgian labour 
market. 
Belgium’s labour market remains fundamentally characterized by high EPL and low 
external numerical flexibility: exactly the opposite of the Danish archetype. The area 
where Belgium can learn the most and the quickest from Denmark, therefore, lies 
elsewhere: in the combination of income security with active labour market policy. Like 
Denmark, Belgium spends a great deal on unemployment insurance and ALMP, but it 
spends it very differently.  
The latest phase of Belgium’s state reform has devolved almost the entire competence 
for ALMP to its three regions. The competences for rehabilitation, activation, and 
sanctioning of the unemployed, will now be together in one single hand. In principle, 
this should allow for a tailored and intelligent approach that maximizes employability. 
Moreover, a substantial part of the job creation schemes has also been regionalized. 
Both the new Flemish and Walloon regional governments have committed themselves 
to streamlining and concentrating existing funds. In view of these institutional changes 
and political intentions, flexicurity’s moment may actually be about to arrive in Belgium 
after all. 
  
Mutual Learning Programme Peer Country Paper 
 
October ,  2014 6 
 
4 Questions 
From a Belgian perspective, flexicurity and the Danish ‘golden triangle’ are, in some 
ways, what Western democracy is to authoritarian developing countries: relatively easy 
to copy but hard to transplant. While Belgium has taken some steps along flexicurity 
pathways, it lacks the foundation upon which a more integrated flexicurity approach can 
be built.  
One of the most intriguing questions is therefore of labour market terraforming: how 
has Denmark succeeded in sufficiently reuniting labour market forces around a 
comprehensive flexicurity approach with mutually reinforcing components, where all 
stakeholders are expected to take part of the responsibility? Without this common 
strategy, shared burden and shared return, the Belgian experience is that flexicurity 
means little more than just in time and just enough reform under pressure.  
Of particular relevance for Belgium is a shared commitment, ambition and responsibility 
in lifelong learning. Lifelong learning is perceived as one of the cornerstones of a 
successful flexicurity agenda, but Belgium has so far failed to convince its stakeholders 
to join forces in this regard. What has triggered the Danish success in this area, and 
what are the components of its durability? To what extent is Danish flexicurity the 
product of a common societal culture that is reflected in labour market institutions, 
rather than the reverse?  
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5 Annex 1: Summary table  
National approach to flexicurity 
 Belgium’s flexicurity profile is traditionally more oriented towards job security 
and income security than it is towards employment security and combination 
security. 
 The crisis years have focused energies on crisis measures while not favouring 
fundamental policy reflections. 
 Belgium was able to reduce the short-term labour market damage of the crisis 
significantly but it has mostly done so by avoiding transitions and through direct 
job creation schemes. 
Assessment of the policy measure 
 Working time and work flexibility have increased since the crisis, while wage 
moderation has become more imposed. 
 A new single dismissal law status for blue collar and white collar workers includes 
an activation component, but its implementation remains uncertain. 
 The right to outplacement in case of dismissal has been extended and will become 
a duty for the worker too. 
 Increased activation, also among older workers, and increased gradual benefit 
reduction are part of a reform of unemployment insurance. 
Assessment of success factors and transferability 
 Flexicurity has not yet entered the DNA of the Belgian labour market organization 
and its stakeholders. 
 The crisis has not enabled decision makers and stakeholders of the Belgian labour 
market to coalesce around a shared ambition for improvement and reform. 
 Like Denmark, Belgium spends a great deal on unemployment insurance and 
ALMP, but it spends it very differently. 
 In view of institutional changes and the political intentions of the new 
governments, flexicurity’s moment may actually be about to arrive in Belgium. 
Questions 
 How has Denmark succeeded in sufficiently reuniting labour market forces 
around a comprehensive flexicurity approach with mutually reinforcing 
components, where all stakeholders are expected to take part of the 
responsibility? 
 What has triggered the Danish success in the area of life-long learning, and 
what are the components of its durability during the crisis? 
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